Insurance for assisting adaptation to climate change in developing countries: a proposed strategy
Adaptation
to climate change, including support for insurance instruments, has emerged on
the climate agenda alongside the reduction of atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations as an essential part of the response to climate change risks. It
is generally accepted that industrialized countries bear a certain
responsibility for adaptation to climate change in developing countries, and
should bear part of the costs. Although a diversity of mechanisms, approaches
and rules for funding adaptation in developing countries has been adopted by
implementing agencies and
governments
in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), adaptation is generally considered to be an underdeveloped part of
the climate regime. Early efforts to address adaptation under the UNFCCC have
focused on capacity building and information exchange with respect to
vulnerability to climate change and possible adaptation strategies. There is an
increasing appreciation that minimizing vulnerability to the economic and
physical impacts of climate-related extreme weather events, including floods,
droughts, typhoons and other weather hazards, can cost-effectively contribute
to reduced vulnerability. Moreover, many in the climate community are
advocating that climate risk reduction be mainstreamed into the development
process to simultaneously contribute to eradicating poverty, furthering
development, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Efforts have aimed
at funding strictly climate-change-related activities, but there are increasing
calls that adaptation should be driven by vulnerability and poverty, and that
it should be mainstreamed into the development process (Kartha et al., 2006).
The
reduction of the escalating losses from floods, droughts, typhoons and other
climate-related disasters is viewed as essential to eradicating poverty and
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Arnold and Kreimer, 2004). In the
past quarter-century, over 95% of disaster deaths occurred in developing
countries, and direct economic losses (averaging US$54 billion per annum) as a
share of national income were more than double in low-income than in
high-income countries (Arnold and Kreimer, 2004). Although the increase in
disaster losses today is largely driven by socio-economic factors, there is
mounting evidence of a significant climate-change signal in disaster events,
for example, increasing extreme precipitation at mid- and high latitudes (Schönwiese
et al., 2003), extreme floods and droughts in temperate and tropical Asia,
severe dry events in the Sahel and southern Africa (IPCC, 2001), and increases
in tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic and the Pacific region (Emanuel,
2005). Scientists, however, cannot accurately assess the contribution of
climate change to current risks. Nevertheless, many in the climate community
are calling for a ‘no-regrets’ adaptation strategy that integrates adaptation
to climate change with adaptation to ‘normal’ climate variability. Improving
the capacity of communities, governments or regions to deal with climate
variability will be likely to improve their resilience to deal with future
climatic changes. This means that increasing attention must be paid to disaster
risk management.
An
important cornerstone for risk management, and a possible no-regrets adaptation
strategy, is insurance and alternative risk-transfer instruments that provide
disaster safety nets for the most vulnerable (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2005).
Without donor support, however, insurance is hardly affordable in highly
exposed developing countries, which helps to explain why only 1% of households
and businesses in low-income countries, and only 3% in middle-income countries,
have catastrophe coverage, compared with 30% in high-income countries (Munich
Re, 2005). Instead of insurance, they rely on support from family and
governments, which is not always forthcoming for catastrophes that affect whole
regions or countries. Disasters exacerbate poverty as victims take out
high-interest loans, sell assets and livestock, or engage in low-risk,
low-yield farming to lessen their exposure to extreme events. Moreover, without
a post-disaster infusion of capital for reconstruction, disasters can have
long-term adverse effects on economic development. As a case in point, 4 years
after the devastation of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the GDP of Honduras was 6%
below pre-disaster projections (Mechler, 2004), and the disaster increased the
number of the poor by 165,000 people (Government of Honduras, 2001).
Climate
risk management, including proactive support for insurance instruments, is
emerging on the climate change adaptation agenda. Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC
calls upon Convention Parties to consider actions, including insurance, to meet
the specific needs and concerns of
developing
countries arising from the adverse impacts of climate change (United Nations,
1992), and Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol explicitly calls for
consideration of the establishment of insurance (United Nations, 1997). In an
early proposal for an ‘international insurance pool’ within the UNFCCC context,
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) put forth the idea of a global
compensation fund fully financed by industrialized countries for the purpose of
compensating low-lying states for sea-level rise damages. The AOSIS proposal
addressed what is arguably an uninsurable risk (since sea-level rise is gradual
and its occurrence predictable) for which the victims have little
responsibility.
This
article addresses a different risk context, that of stochastic sudden- and
slow-onset weatherrelated disasters, and suggests a two-tiered climate
insurance strategy. The first tier, and the core of this strategy, is the
establishment of a climate insurance programme that would offer capacity
building and financial support to nascent (weather) disaster insurance systems
in highly exposed developing countries. This support could be offered
independently or in partnership with other donor organizations by creating a
climate insurance facility or other mechanism. Alternatively, it could be
‘mainstreamed’ into the operations of a multi-purpose disaster risk management
facility. A main purpose of the climate insurance programme is to enable the
establishment of public/ private safety nets for stochastic climate-related
shocks by assisting the development of insurancerelated instruments that are
affordable to the poor, coupled with actions and incentives for proactive
preventive (adaptation) measures. As a second tier of support, adaptation
funding could be apportioned to post-event relief for weather-related disaster
risks that are otherwise uninsured because of data or institutional
limitations.
The intent of this
discussion is not to provide a concrete proposal for negotiation, but rather to
suggest a broadly conceived climate insurance strategy as a basis for further
discussion and deliberation. We begin in the next section by briefly reviewing the
AOSIS and other recent climate insurance proposals that provide the background
for our suggested strategy. We continue in Section 3 by outlining the workings
of the first-tier climate insurance programme, which builds on developing
country initiatives and thus avoids the expense and obstacles of operating an
independent system. Based on experience in India, Malawi, Turkey and Mexico, we
give concrete examples of the types of insurance initiatives that the programme
might support. In Section 4, we offer preliminary thoughts on a possible second
tier, which would provide disaster relief contingent on credible risk
management policies or actions. Section 5 discusses challenges and
opportunities for financing and implementing this two-tiered strategy. Section
6 concludes by briefly reviewing the advantages of this proposal, including its
feasibility and potential for linking with other donor initiatives, providing
incentives for loss reduction (adaptation) and targeting the most vulnerable.
The unresolved issues are discussed, including the necessary institutional
design, possible limits on support (for instance that funds be commensurate
with the incremental risk of climate change), and sources for the requisite
resources.
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